Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: A
Country Panel Analysis by Colombo, Daniel Gama e & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ICEPP Working Papers International Center for Public Policy 
10-1-2019 
Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: A Country Panel 
Analysis 
Daniel Gama e Colombo 
Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anísio Tei, daniel.colombo@inep.gov.br 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 
Georgia State University, jorgemartinez@gsu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp 
Recommended Citation 
Colombo, Daniel Gama e and Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, "Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: A 
Country Panel Analysis" (2019). ICEPP Working Papers. 136. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/icepp/136 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Center for Public Policy at ScholarWorks 
@ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEPP Working Papers by an authorized 




International Center for Public Policy 







Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: A 
Country Panel Analysis  
 
 


















International Center for Public Policy 




Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: 




Daniel Gama e Colombo 








International Center for Public Policy 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, Georgia 30303 
United States of America 
 
Phone: (404) 413-0235 
Fax: (404) 651-4449 
Email: paulbenson@gsu.edu  
Website: http://icepp.gsu.edu/ 
 
Copyright 2019, the Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University. 
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized 










International Center for Public Policy 
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
 
The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies was established at Georgia State University with the 
objective of promoting excellence in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public policy. 
In addition to two academic departments (economics and public administration), the Andrew 
Young School houses seven leading research centers and policy programs, including the 
International Center for Public Policy. 
 
The mission of the International Center for Public Policy (ICePP) at the Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies is to provide academic and professional training, applied research, and technical 
assistance in support of sound public policy and sustainable economic growth in developing and 
transitional economies.  
 
ICePP is recognized worldwide for its efforts in support of economic and public policy reforms 
through technical assistance and training around the world. This reputation has been built serving 
a diverse client base, including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), finance ministries, government 
organizations, legislative bodies, and private sector institutions. 
 
The success of ICePP reflects the breadth and depth of its in-house technical expertise. The 
Andrew Young School's faculty are leading experts in economics and public policy and have 
authored books, published in major academic and technical journals, and have extensive 
experience in designing and implementing technical assistance and training programs. Andrew 
Young School faculty have been active in policy reform in over 40 countries around the world. 
Our technical assistance strategy is not merely to provide technical prescriptions for policy reform, 
but to engage in a collaborative effort with host governments and donor agencies to identify and 
analyze the issues at hand, arrive at policy solutions, and implement reforms. 
 
ICePP specializes in four broad policy areas: 
 
▪ Fiscal policy (including tax reforms, public expenditure reviews, tax administration reform) 
▪ Fiscal decentralization (including decentralization reforms, design of intergovernmental 
transfer systems, urban government finance) 
▪ Budgeting and fiscal management (including local government budgeting, performance-
based budgeting, capital budgeting, multi-year budgeting) 
▪ Economic analysis and revenue forecasting (including micro-simulation, time series 
forecasting) 
 
For more information about our technical assistance activities and training programs, please visit 
our website at http://icepp.gsu.edu or contact us by email at paulbenson@gsu.edu. 
 
 
Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: 
A Country Panel Analysis 
 
Daniel Gama e Colombo1 and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez 2 
October 2019 
Abstract 
This paper presents a first analysis of the potential link between the level of fiscal 
decentralization of a country and its public investment in innovation. We present a 
theoretical model where a ‘benevolent government’ invests in R&D aiming at 
maximizing net income, and R&D results are subject to interregional knowledge 
spillovers. The model predicts that decentralization leads to a lower level of public 
spending on innovation, and to a lower share of basic research in the government 
R&D budget. These hypotheses are empirically tested using country aggregate data. 
The results provide empirical support to the mentioned hypotheses, as we find 
evidence that higher levels of both expenditure and revenue decentralization are 
associated with a lower intensity of basic research in public R&D and with a lower 
level of R&D spending. The strength of the evidence, however, is weakened by the 
small sample size and shortcomings of the indicators used in the analysis. 
Keywords: applied research; basic research; fiscal decentralization; 
innovation policy; knowledge spillovers 
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 As many countries continue to deepen their decentralization policies (OECD 2016), 
science, technology and innovation (ST&I) remain central in government strategies to promote 
growth and overcome societal challenges, especially in the aftermath of the 2008–09 crisis 
(OECD 2014). In this paper, we examine how these two policy trends interact, and, more 
specifically, whether there is a significant association between fiscal decentralization and public 
spending on research and development (R&D). 
 The fiscal federalism literature (briefly reviewed in the following section) has presented 
evidence of how the level of decentralization (measured both on the revenue and expenditure 
sides) affects, among other things, government spending, the assignment of functions, the 
composition of budgets and the delivery of public policies. The main factors and economic 
forces that explain such effects are distinct preferences and circumstances among subnational 
governments (Oates 1999), interjurisdictional spillovers (Hulten and Schwab 1997), factor 
mobility (Brennan and Buchanan 1980) and state competition (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986). 
The impacts of fiscal decentralization on economic growth and a long list of other government 
objectives have been recently review by Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas, and Sacchi (2017). 
However, up to this point, to the best of our knowledge there has been no research on the impact 
on ST&I policy and how distinct levels of decentralization can change government incentives to 
foster innovation. 
 Similarly, the findings and lessons from the decentralization literature have not been 
carefully considered in the field of economics of innovation, whether to explain or to provide 
recommendations for policy design and for the assignment of roles and functions to different 
levels of government. Yet, there is a strong case to suspect that fiscal decentralization should 
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affect public spending on R&D, mostly because of the presence of significant knowledge 
spillovers. After all, Oates’ (1972) “fiscal decentralization theorem,” which is considered the 
bedrock of modern fiscal federalism theory, explicitly assumed away the presence of spillovers. 
Also, as discussed in the next section, different empirical analyses have provided evidence that a 
substantial part of R&D results is not internalized by the institution developing a new technology 
and that such externalities spread unevenly throughout different regions, with neighboring agents 
being in a better position to benefit from new knowledge flows (Peri 2005).  
 Considering this gap in the literature, this paper aims to present a first analysis and 
evidence on the link between fiscal decentralization and public spending on R&D. At first, we 
identify opposing forces that may affect this relationship. On one side, decentralized governance 
may lead to underprovision of public services characterized by large externalities that are not 
bounded to the subnational authority jurisdiction (Oates 2008a)—such as in the case of ST&I. 
On the other side, fiscal competition may generate incentives for subnational governments to 
increase innovation spending to attract new capital investment (Keen and Marchand 1997). The 
analysis becomes more complicated once we abandon a uniform view of R&D and distinguish 
between basic and applied research, with different levels of spillovers and potential to attract 
investment.1 
Two main questions are addressed herein: (a) whether the level of fiscal decentralization 
is a significant explanatory variable of the share of R&D in the government budget, once we 
control for other relevant country features, and (b) whether decentralization is also associated 
                                                          
1 Throughout this paper, we use the standard definitions of innovation related concepts presented in the OECD 
Frascati Manual: Both basic and applied research refer to an original investigation, but the first does not aim at any 
particular use, while the second is directed at a practical purpose or application; development, on the other hand, is 
based on a previous existing set of knowledge and has the objective of creating new products or processes, or 
improving existing ones (OECD 2015). 
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with the balance between basic research and applied research in the public R&D bundle. To help 
answer these questions, we first propose a theoretical model explaining the main economic 
forces that shape the government decision, and then we test its results through an empirical 
analysis using country panel aggregate data on government expenditures. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
intersection of the economic literatures on fiscal decentralization and knowledge spillovers 
arising from R&D investments. We then summarize the theoretical model (presented in detail in 
Appendix A) and derive the propositions to be tested empirically. We follow by describing the 
data, performing the empirical analysis and discussing the results, along with potential policy 
implications. The final section concludes and suggests further research agenda on this subject.  
Review of the Relevant Literature 
 The economic debates on fiscal decentralization and on R&D knowledge spillovers 
constitute the theoretical basis of both the model and the empirical analysis presented later in the 
paper. Here we review the main relevant arguments and evidence presented by the previous 
literature on these topics. 
Fiscal Decentralization, Interregional Spillovers and the Composition of Public Expenditures 
 The “traditional branch” of the fiscal federalism theory (Oates 2008a) gives clear 
guidelines for the division of functions between different levels of government. Following the 
decentralization theorem (Oates 1972, 1999), local public goods should be more efficiently 
provided if decentralized to local governments, while global public goods and broad policies 
such as macroeconomic stability must be carried out at the national level. The original theorem is 
based on the strong assumption that consumption of these goods is geographically defined. That 
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means it only accepts the existence of “pure local” (consumption limited to a particular region or 
area) or global (that benefits all regions) goods (Kappeler and Välilä 2008).  
 This requirement was relaxed by later studies, allowing for a third type of public goods, 
which, despite of being consumed locally, generate interregional spillovers that influence the 
production or welfare of people residing elsewhere (Besley and Coate 2003; Feidler and Staal 
2012; Hulten and Schwab 1997; Oates 2008a, b; Ponce-Rodriguez et al. 2018). These 
externalities reduce the incentives of local governments to efficiently invest in these goods, as 
part of the benefits arising from them is not internalized within the producing jurisdiction. As a 
result, this leads to the inefficient underprovision of public goods with externalities in a 
decentralized policy setup.  
 The problem of interregional spillovers gains in complexity when factor mobility is 
recognized. A long strand of the previous literature has argued that households or capital can 
move to preferred locations to take advantage of lower taxes or higher levels of benefits from 
public goods or infrastructure (Tiebout 1956). Once mobility is present, one effect is that fiscal 
decentralization will tend to limit taxing power and government size because local governments 
have to compete for constituents and resources that are mobile, as in the ‘Leviathan hypothesis’ 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Also with mobility, the erosion of the tax base can also lead to an 
overall reduction of public services provision through a ‘race to the bottom’ by competing 
jurisdictions (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986), along with the erosion of the welfare state and 
public infrastructure (Sinn 2003), and also possibly with a reduction of gains arising from 
economies of scale (Hulten and Schwab 1997). 
 A separate branch of the fiscal federalism literature has analyzed how decentralization 
impacts the functioning of the government, both in terms of its political institutions and delivery 
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of public policies (Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas and Sacchi 2017). A part of these studies has 
focused on the composition of government budgets, although this is still a relatively new and 
underexplored topic (Jia, Guo and Zhang 2014). In theoretical terms, it is also possible that 
subnational government competition could lead to a ‘race to the top.’ In the model proposed by 
Keen and Marchand (1997), regions compete to attract investment, and as a result they 
overinvest in public input to business (such as infrastructure), at the cost of direct consumption 
benefits to residents. Subnational governments may also compete to attract mobile households by 
altering their budget composition, such as raising their expenditure in education (Busemeyer 
2007).  
 Most of the literature on fiscal decentralization and composition of the public budget is 
comprised of empirically focused studies (for literature reviews, see Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-
Peñas and Sacchi 2017; Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2016). The majority 
of them converge to the conclusion that higher decentralization levels lead to more public 
productive investment. There is evidence of this result for physical capital, infrastructure and 
housing (Jia, Guo and Zhang 2014; Kappeler and Välilä 2008; Sacchi and Salotti 2016), and for 
education, health or human capital (Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2016; 
Ashworth, Galli and Padovano 2009; Busemeyer 2007; Faguet 2004; Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-
Peñas and Sacchi 2017; Kappeler and Välilä 2008; Sacchi and Salotti 2016). 
 However, up to this point, this literature has largely neglected the analysis of public 
expenditure in ST&I. Only one of the studies in our literature review considered this spending 
category in the empirical analysis (Grisorio and Prota 2015), but even in this case, the authors 
did not include it in their econometric exercise. 
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R&D and Knowledge Spillovers 
The study of innovation policies has received great attention from economists of 
different schools of thought in the last several decades (Edler and Fagerberg 2017). In theoretical 
terms, there are sound grounds for public intervention in the field of ST&I, mostly because 
market failures lead to inefficient underinvestment in R&D by private agents, thus requiring 
additional public resources to supplement it (Arrow 1962; Köhler, Laredo and Rammer 2012).  
Among the failures identified by the literature, the incomplete appropriation of R&D 
results is considered the most important economic rationale for public innovation policies 
(Köhler, Laredo and Rammer 2012). Positive externalities or knowledge spillovers are an 
intrinsic feature of innovation, because of the non-rival and non-excludable nature of knowledge, 
and also because of very small transmission costs (Arrow 1962). The non-appropriated 
knowledge can be used by different firms and individuals for production and future research, and 
as the R&D investing firm does not profit from or appropriate such spillovers, it does not 
consider them in its spending decisions, leading to suboptimal investment levels. This justifies 
efficiency-enhancing government action to increase overall R&D spending through public 
subsidies or other incentives to promote private innovation investment. 
As knowledge spillovers obtained a prominent role in innovation and economic growth 
analysis, a substantial empirical literature has attempted to quantify them (for a review, see Hall, 
Mairesse and Mohnen 2010). Most studies did find evidence of spillovers arising from R&D 
(Wieser 2005), and estimates suggest that they actually represent the bulk of innovation 
outcomes, reaching up to twice the value of internalized results or more (Bernstein and Nadiri 
1989; Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen 2013).  
 
7 
The impact of spillovers, however, is not even across firms, and geographical distance 
plays a major role in their dispersal, at least for some time. These externalities are considered 
spatially localized (Anselin, Varga and Acs 1997; Breschi and Lissoni 2001), as firms located in 
the same region or country where the technology is developed tend to benefit more from it. 
Using patent data from European regions until the 1990s, Bottazzi and Peri (2003) concluded 
that R&D spillovers may be limited to a 300 kilometers range from the region of origin; Peri 
(2005) estimated that no more than 20 percent of created knowledge leaves such region of origin, 
while less than 9 percent leaves the country. There is also evidence that firms located close to 
academic centers are more likely to apply their research findings first (Mansfield and Lee 1996). 
The main explanations presented for this geographic concentration are the tacit nature of 
knowledge, geographic barriers to knowledge flows, linguistic factors and the agglomeration of 
production (Audretsch and Feldman 1996, Maurseth and Verspagen 2002).  
A part of such externalities flows to other areas, positively affecting research and 
productivity at the interregional (Anselin, Varga and Acs 1997; Bottazzi and Peri 2003; Kang, 
Dall'Erba and Peng 2017) and international levels (Malerba, Mancusi; and Montobbio 2013). 
The channels of transmission of such knowledge can be direct, i.e., the acquisition of publicly-
available information, or indirect, through the mobility of researchers, trade or productivity 
improvements caused by foreign direct investment (Gersbach 2009; Schetter 2014). 
The magnitude and geographic dispersal of knowledge spillovers can be influenced by 
different factors, such as the nature of innovative R&D. The level of spillovers is an important 
distinction between basic and applied research. In his seminal article, Nelson (1959) argued that 
while basic research is the major source of scientific breakthroughs and significant technology 
developments, it presents ‘substantial external economies’, as its results can be applied in 
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different fields, and in many cases their value cannot be captured through patents, as they do not 
constitute practical solutions to existing problems. Basic research often generates larger and 
more pervasive knowledge externalities that propagate and can be used to improve productivity 
or to foster innovation across different economic sectors (Denti 2009). Empirical analyses have 
confirmed that larger spillovers arise from basic research (Salter and Martin 2001), and Griliches 
(1985) and Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) have also found a “premium” for basic research, 
meaning that it is more important for productivity increase.  
Moreover, there are arguments to suggest that basic research generates more knowledge 
spillovers that spread geographically and benefit other regions or countries. In a two-country 
model, Gersbach and Schneider (2015) concluded that basic research conducted abroad partially 
substitutes local investment in this activity to foster private innovation, while applied research 
generates a monopoly to the innovator with no spillovers (for the duration of the patent). A few 
empirical studies investigated this topic, presenting evidence that support this argument. 
Analyzing a group of OECD countries, Funk (2002) found that basic research generates much 
larger international spillovers; according to Anselin, Varga and Acs (1997), R&D at U.S. 
universities (more directed to basic research) influences innovative activity outside the respective 
metropolitan statistical area, while the effects of private R&D are contained within such range. 
Crespi and Geuna (2008) found that, due to the high level of spillovers across OECD countries, 
basic science should be understood as ‘an international enterprise’. Empirical research on 
university-firm collaboration also suggests that knowledge transfer for basic research is less 




The literature on knowledge spillovers discussed in this section supports the notion that 
innovation presents typical features of public goods, i.e., non-rivalry and non-excludability 
(Arrow 1962), and it is treated as such in different studies (Malerba, Mancusi and Montobbio 
2013; Verspagen and De Loo 1999). Moreover, its positive externalities are affected by spatial or 
geographical distance, so that innovation can be considered a case of local public good with 
interjurisdictional spillovers (Gersbach 2009; Gersbach and Schneider 2015). The fiscal 
decentralization literature discussed previously suggests that, in these cases, there are grounds to 
suspect that the provision of such public goods might be influenced by the level of 
decentralization of government activities in a country. The direction and magnitude of such 
effect, however, are not clear, and this is a topic that has not been explored by the economic 
literature so far. The theoretical model (summarized in the next section) and the empirical 
analysis that follows are a first attempt to fill this gap.  
Linking Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D: Theoretical Propositions  
Considering the concepts and arguments discussed in the previous section, we present a 
simple model in Appendix A to explain how fiscal decentralization can affect the share and 
composition of government expenditures in R&D, considering the broad categories of basic and 
applied research. Our objective is to model the economic forces that shape the decision of a 
‘benevolent government’ that aims to maximize net income in the country or in the respective 
region in the short run (Besley and Coate 2003; Dhillon, Wooders and Zissimos 2007; Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski 1986).  
The model assumes a closed economy with a large number of symmetric regions and one 
firm located at each region. Firms compete to attract capital, and they also have to pay taxes that 
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are levied on each unit of capital invested in the respective period.2 Firms’ output depends on the 
capital they attract to the region and on their production technology level. The state of 
technology evolves according to (a) the investment made by the government in R&D within the 
region, (b) the composition of the R&D investment bundle, and (c) knowledge spillovers 
captured from all other regions. Private innovation investment is not considered in the model, a 
simplification made for convenience, so we do not have to consider firms’ innovation efforts, 
allowing us to focus on the analysis on the government budget dedicated to innovation.3  
Government budgets are entirely spent in public R&D investment. Public R&D is 
broadly divided in basic and applied research (Morales 2004; Park 1998). The main distinction 
between them is that only applied research can improve technology, but its productivity and 
results are improved by basic research (Morales 2004). Public R&D yields knowledge spillovers 
that flow to other regions and positively affect the production technology of firms located 
therein. Based on the literature discussed previously, we assume that interjurisdictional spillovers 
represent a higher share of results in the case of basic research, both because it yields more 
knowledge externalities in general (i.e., the share of results internalized by the R&D-performing 
firm or institution is smaller) and because a larger share of such externalities spreads 
geographically, comparing to the case of applied research (Nelson 1959; Gersbach and Schneider 
2015; Funk 2002).  
In order to maximize net income, the government decides (a) the level of taxation (and 
therefore of R&D investment), and (b) the composition of the public R&D bundle. To 
                                                          
2 This tax base was chosen to highlight the state competition and the tradeoff between tax cost and improved product 
of capital as a result of technological improvement (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986; Oates and Schwab 1988; Keen 
and Marchand 1997). This choice, however, is not critical to the conclusions of the model. 
3 An extension of this model in future research could incorporate this and other factors and assess the potential 
effects of fiscal decentralization on private decision-making, considering the interactions between private and public 
investment, along with any substitution (crowding-out) or additionality effects. 
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hypothesize on the potential effects of decentralization, we follow similar analyses (Besley and 
Coate 2003; Dhillon, Wooders and Zissimos 2007; Feidler and Staal 2012) and compare the 
optimal government decision in the extreme cases of complete decentralization (regional 
governments are the only tax authorities and have full discretion to decide on their spending) and 
a total centralized government (the national government retains full power over public revenue 
and expenditure).  
The main outcomes of the model are determined by the level of knowledge spillovers 
generated by R&D activities, state competition and capital mobility (according to the Leviathan, 
or ‘race to the bottom’ hypothesis) and by new technology developed by public research that 
counterbalances the cost of taxes by increasing the productivity of capital. The main differences 
between the centralized and decentralized cases are: (a) regional governments do not consider 
knowledge spillovers that do not accrue to their own local economy; and (b) subnational 
governments compete to attract capital, considering the effects of their choices on both the tax 
cost of capital and technology improvement.  
Based on such differences, we extract the two following main propositions from the 
model about the relation between fiscal decentralization and public R&D investment: 
Proposition 1: All other things constant, a higher level of fiscal decentralization should 
lead to a lower intensity of basic research within the public R&D bundle, as a lower share of its 
results stays within the region.  
The main force driving the optimal composition of the public R&D bundle is the 
different levels of knowledge spillovers of basic and applied research. The central government 
decision is not affected by such interregional externalities, as they positively affect the overall 
country income. Therefore, the central government bases its decision solely on the productivity 
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parameters of both types of R&D. The regional government, on the other hand, weights such 
parameters by the level of interregional spillovers applicable to each type of R&D, as its 
objective is to maximize income within the state or province, and therefore, it does not take into 
consideration any value generated elsewhere. As basic research yields more interjurisdictional 
externalities (as assumed), the optimal decision in a decentralized setup is a lower share of basic 
research within the public R&D bundle. This is the first main prediction of the model to be 
empirically tested in the next section.  
Proposition 2: All other things constant, a higher level of fiscal decentralization should 
lead to a lower level of public spending on innovation, as a consequence of knowledge spillovers 
(that reduce regional governments’ incentives to invest in R&D) and of state competition to 
attract capital (that limits the subnational government budget), in spite of the contribution of 
technology to the regional product.  
The optimal level of R&D investment in both cases is affected by three forces: regional 
spillovers, the negative impact of taxes on both capital investment and available income, and the 
positive impact of public R&D on the production technology. The first one follows the same 
reasoning of the composition of the R&D bundle: as the contribution of innovation to the 
regional product is smaller than to the national output because of interregional externalities 
(arising from both types of research), subnational governments tend to spend less on R&D. 
Meanwhile, the same effect is not observed in the centralized setup. 
However, when taxes are defined at the regional level, they also influence the level of 
capital investment in each region. Such effect, however, is ambiguous. The tax cost reduces net 
capital gain and discourages capital investment, so state competition and capital mobility in the 
decentralized setup act as a limit to government revenue and spending, following the ‘Leviathan 
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hypothesis’ (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). On the other hand, public investment in R&D 
(financed by taxes) increases both the technology factor and the production, increasing capital 
earnings and thus attracting additional capital.  
As argued by Kappeler and Välilä (2008), the final outcome of these three forces cannot 
be determined theoretically a priori. Nevertheless, we expect innovation spending to be lower in 
a decentralized environment, as in most cases the negative effects of state competition and 
interregional spillovers should overcome the benefits of technological improvement within the 
region. Combined, these forces should cause the tax rate established by the regional government 
to be lower than the one determined by a centralized tax authority.4 This constitutes the second 
prediction to be tested in the empirical analysis described in the next section.  
Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we present a quantitative analysis to test the two propositions derived 
from the theoretical model. For such purpose, we investigate whether the level of fiscal 
decentralization of a country is a significant explanatory variable of both the magnitude and 
composition of government spending on R&D, after controlling for different economic, 
demographic, institutional and technological features. 
 Data 
The data used for this empirical analysis were collected from different sources and 
organized in a panel dataset that contains observations for 47 countries in different years, 
covering the period 1996–2015.5 Data on public budget, spending and revenue for each country 
                                                          
4 Proposition #2 is not just a direct implication or repetition of the Leviathan hypothesis or the ‘race to the bottom’ 
argument (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986), as the tax cost (and its negative effect on capital attraction) constitutes 
only one of the forces at play that lead to such conclusion of the model. 
5 List of countries and years presented in Table B3 of Appendix B, along with the mean value of the dependent 
variables for each country. 
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were extracted from the IMF Government Finance Statistics (IMF-GFS) database (IMF 2014, 
2018). Economic, demographic and technological features were gathered from the World Bank 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). To control for the level of education or human 
capital of the population, we use the Education Index of the Human Development Indices and 
Indicators (UNDP 2018). The IDB Database of Political Institutions is the source of variables 
related to the political system and orientation of the party controlling the national executive 
branch. And an alternative measure for fiscal decentralization (used as robustness check) comes 
from the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al. 2016). 
However, comparable data on public innovation spending are still not available for many 
countries, or in many cases there is only information for a limited number of years. Also, our 
sample is limited to observations (country-year pairs) with at least one positive value for R&D 
spending (basic or applied). For these reasons, our dataset constitutes an unbalanced panel with 
missing values for different countries and periods (we discuss this limitation and its implications 
in further detail below). 
The level of fiscal decentralization of a country in a given year is measured using 
information from the IMF-GFS database. The shares of subnational levels of government in 
general government revenue (excluded intergovernmental grants) and total public spending are 
used as indicators of revenue and expenditure decentralization, respectively (we consider these 
two cases in separate estimates, as they tend to be highly correlated). These definitions or 
classifications have been criticized for not capturing or reflecting appropriately other relevant 
dimensions of fiscal decentralization, such as the division of functions between government 
levels and the political process by which authorities take office (Asatryan, Feld and Geys 2015; 
Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas and Sacchi 2017). In spite of such limitations, the same or 
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similar indicators have been used in different papers (Grisorio and Prota 2015; Kappeler and 
Välilä 2008; Sacchi and Salotti 2016), and, considering the challenge of summarizing a complex 
feature in a single variable, they can be accepted as measures to empirically assess the potential 
effects of fiscal decentralization or its correlation with other features of the government budget. 
And whereas the IMF-GSF database does not comprise information on the other mentioned 
dimensions of decentralization (Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas and Sacchi 2017), on the plus 
side it provides a larger country sample than other options (Asatryan, Feld and Geys 2015) and 
standardized and updated data across countries that allows for a comparison and panel analyses, 
such as the one presented herein. 
Empirical Model, Identification Strategy and Robustness Checks 
For the specification of the empirical model, we assume that the public R&D budget is 
determined by all government levels in light of economic, technological and demographic 
features of the country, the political orientation of the party controlling the executive branch (at 
the national level), and broader decisions related to the public budget. And as public innovation 
yields different payoffs for central and regional governments, such decision is also affected by 
the country’s level of fiscal decentralization.  
We consider that all variables affect government budget decisions contemporaneously, a 
specification used in different empirical papers (Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab 2016; Ashworth, Galli and Padovano 2009; Busemeyer 2007). In addition, we introduce 
lagged versions of the dependent variables as explanatory ones to account for adjustment costs 
on budget composition.  
We expect decisions on the public R&D budget to be influenced by the level of 
technological development and weight of high-technology sectors in the economy. To control for 
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technological disparities between countries, we include the following explanatory variables: (a) 
number of patent applications per capita filed by residents, as a measure of knowledge stock and 
development; (b) to account for international competitiveness of national’s high-technology 
industries and for the export contribution of their products and services to the economy, we 
include an interaction term between international trade and high-tech exports; and (c) share of 
the population with access to the internet.6 
On those bases, we use a simple linear reduced-form specification to assess whether the 
correlation of decentralization with public R&D: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (1) 
where yit represents one of the four dependent variables (defined as: the share of basic, applied and 
total R&D spending in the public budget, and the share of basic research within the public R&D 
bundle or ‘basic research intensity’);7 Xit is a vector of control observed variables that influence or 
are taken into consideration by the government to determine its R&D budget. The estimating 
model also considers country time-invariant features or fixed effects (fi), and a non-observed 
random error term (uit). 
The group of explanatory variables (Xit) includes a lagged version of the dependent 
variable (to account for past decisions and control for adjustment costs); the levels of fiscal 
decentralization (revenue or expenditure) and decentralization vertical imbalance;8 the size of 
                                                          
6 We do not to include private R&D investment as an explanatory variable of the model because of endogeneity or 
feedback effects that could bias the estimates. We also do not include any variables to control for the strength or 
other features related to the intellectual property regime (IPR) of each country, as recent literature findings failed to 
find a clear link between IPR and innovation policy (Edler, Cameron and Hajhashem 2015), and between IPR and 
innovation results (Blind 2016). 
7 Such variables consider public spending at all levels of government jointly. We do not distinguish between 
national and subnational expenditures (see the definition presented in Table B1 of Appendix B). 
8 This variable was included because different studies have found evidence that the difference between own revenue 
and own spending at a given level of government (vertical fiscal imbalances or gaps) can affect the public budgets 
(Eyraud and Lusinyan 2013; Borge and Rattsø 2002). The definition (see Table B1 in Appendix B) follows the one 
used by Sorens (2016). 
 
17 
government; land area; level of economic activity (GDP, GDP per capita, and level of 
unemployment); demographic factors (size of the labor force, share of population in urban areas, 
population density and education index); technological development (number of patent 
applications per capita filled by residents, internet access, and interaction term between trade and 
high-tech exports); and variables on the political system and orientation of the national chief 
executive party (presidential system, parliamentary system, left-wing and right-wing government 
chief party). In addition, a dummy for member countries of the European Union was included to 
control for the cooperation for R&D and innovation in the region. The list, definition and sources 
of all variables used in the empirical analysis are presented in Table B1 of Appendix B, and 
Table B2 displays the main descriptive statistics for these variables.  
We estimate the parameters of Equation 1 using two-step system-GMM (Arellano and 
Bond 1991; Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), which is largely considered the 
‘workhorse in estimating dynamic panel data’ (Kappeler and Välilä 2008) and has been used in 
several related studies (Jia, Guo and Zhang 2014; Sacchi and Salotti 2016). When defining the 
instrumental variables, none of the explanatory variables were assumed to be exogenous, and a 
set of year dummies was included as exogenous instruments. Considering the gaps in our 
unbalanced panel, we apply forward orthogonal deviations transformation (Arellano and Bover 
1995), and in light of the limited number of observations, we reduce instrument count by 
collapsing instruments into a column vector instrument (Roodman 2006), applying principal 
components analysis (Mehrhoff 2009), and reducing the number of lags of the explanatory 
variables used as instruments. Statistical significance is assessed at a 95 percent confidence level.  
Considering the small sample size and limitations of the existing data, we run a number 
of robustness checks to test whether the results obtained in the main model are sensitive to our 
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choices of data, identification strategy and model specification. First, considering the limitations 
of the fiscal decentralization variable and of the IMF-GFS database discussed previously, we run 
estimates using the indices of regional governments’ policy and tax authority (as alternative 
indicators of expenditure and revenue decentralization, accordingly) published by the Regional 
Authority Index - RAI (Hooghe et al. 2016).9 Second, as the literature suggests that the two-step 
GMM might be sensitive to instrument count and choice in the case of small samples (Roodman 
2006), we also estimate the coefficients using a fixed effects model. Third, to check whether the 
heterogeneity of countries in our sample might bias or affect the results, we run a set of estimates 
considering only countries with a minimum level of economic development, i.e., a GDP per 
capita higher than US$10,000 (considering the latest observation in the dataset for each one).10 
Finally, we estimate the parameters of Equation 1 multiple times, considering different versions 
of the vector of control variables Xit, gradually excluding each of the explanatory variables, to 
check if the sign and statistical significance of the fiscal decentralization coefficient remain 
stable. 
Estimation Results 
The estimated coefficients of the empirical model and their statistical significance are 
presented in Table 1, along with the results of the over-identification, serial correlation and 
sampling adequacy tests. In none of the estimates the AR(2) test rejects the hypothesis of no 
second-order correlation of differenced residuals, suggesting that the instruments are orthogonal 
to the error terms. The Hansen and Sargan tests also do not reject exogeneity of the instruments 
for any of the regressions (at a 95% confidence level). And the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (KMO) 
                                                          
9 Using these alternative estimators substantially lower the number of available observations (the RAI dataset covers 
the period up to 2010), and, for this reason, the fixed effects (FE) model is used to estimate the parameters. 
10 We also tried to limit the sample to OECD countries, but the resulting dataset is too small and does not provide a 
reliable basis to run the estimates. 
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for sampling adequacy indicates that the principal component analysis reduced the number 
instruments without losing relevant identifying information. These results indicate that the 
lagged variables used as instruments efficiently mitigate endogeneity problems, reducing bias 
and improving consistency of the results. 
Table 1. Estimation Results 
 Fiscal Decentralization = Expenditure Decentralization  Fiscal Decentralization = Revenue Decentralization 
Independent 
variables 



































0.974*** 0.351*** 0.576*** 0.960***  0.778*** 0.337*** 0.620*** 0.715*** 
(0.036) (0.044) (0.072) (0.092)  (0.094) (0.086) (0.065) (0.084) 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
-0.024*** -0.014*** -0.023*** -0.913**  -0.028** -0.020*** -0.024*** -1.372** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.427)  (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.606) 
Decentralization 
imbalance 
0.034*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.910*  0.008** 0.006* 0.011*** 0.713** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.528)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.325) 
Unemployment 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* 0.007***  0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.007*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
GDP per capita (ll) 0.002*** 0.000 0.009*** -0.531  -0.016* -0.005 -0.019** -0.274 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.448)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.662) 
Labor force (ll) 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 -0.640  -0.022** -0.015** -0.029*** -0.493 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.470)  (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.810) 
Urban pop.  0.000* -0.000** 0.000*** 0.005*  0.000 -0.000** 0.000* 0.014** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
Land area 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*  0.000 0.000 0.000*** -0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP (ll) -0.001** 0.002** -0.003*** 0.608  0.020** 0.012** 0.026*** 0.351 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.438)  (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.769) 
Party orientation: 
left wing 
-0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.004  -0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.030 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.021)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.028) 
Party orientation: 
right wing 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.050*  -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.013 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.030)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.052) 
Pol. system: 
presidential 
0.004 0.007 0.005 0.340  0.003 0.005 -0.000 0.420* 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.223)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.215) 
Pol. System: 
parliamentary 
0.004*** -0.003** 0.002 0.110  0.001 -0.003* 0.003 0.242 




as % of GDP 
-0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001  0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Patent app. per 
capita 
0.252 1.401 -8.330** 127.436  4.261 0.223 -2.864 159.122 
(1.600) (3.094) (3.719) (183.534)  (3.276) (1.795) (4.628) (118.980) 
Population density -0.000** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000  -0.000** 0.000** -0.000** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet access 0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 -0.001**  -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** -0.002** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Trade*high-tech. 
exports 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000  -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education index -0.018*** 0.018** -0.038*** 0.875**  0.009 -0.006 -0.000 0.976 
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.439)  (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.608) 
EU country dummy -0.000 0.005** 0.004 -0.035  -0.002 -0.008** -0.003 -0.152 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.102)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.118) 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.673  -0.045*** -0.015 -0.037 -0.249 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.102)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.035) (0.805) 
Observations 433 433 433 429  433 433 433 429 
No. of countries 42 42 42 41  42 42 42 41 
Wald chi-squared 2.640e+07 3.040e+07 70626 23213  38067 3610 54210 27006 
Wald p-value 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
Sargan stat. 13.52 54.82 55.35 11.53  12.82 49.46 46.93 10.78 
Sargan p-value 0.985 0.127 0.139 0.828  0.979 0.101 0.179 0.931 
Hansen J-stat 38.18 51.43 36.50 12.55  21.50 20.41 17.02 11.80 
Hansen p-value 0.0750 0.206 0.813 0.766  0.664 0.991 0.999 0.894 
AR(1) test 0.00197 0.000737 3.00e-05 0.0390  0.00121 0.00478 4.90e-05 0.0848 
AR(2) test 0.657 0.374 0.968 0.157  0.606 0.311 0.872 0.119 
KMO 0.895 0.744 0.787 0.948  0.945 0.569 0.683 0.965 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients and standard errors estimated through 
two-step system GMM, applying forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were 
assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments. AR(1), AR(2) are the first 
and second order autocorrelation tests, and Sargan and Hansen are the overidentification tests. KMO is the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. 
The first four columns show the results for the expenditure decentralization analysis. We 
find evidence that this type of decentralization is negatively correlated with both types of R&D 
spending: our estimates suggest that an additional percentage point (p.p.) of expenditure 
decentralization is associated with a reduction of the share of basic R&D in the total public 
budget of around 0.024 p.p.; in the case of applied R&D, spending decreases around 0.014 p.p. 
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As a consequence, the share of overall R&D in government spending is also decreased by 
approximately by 0.023 p.p. (per additional decentralization p.p.), and the composition of the 
public innovation bundle changes, with a reduction of basic research intensity (share of basic 
research in public R&D) of around 0.91 p.p.  
Revenue decentralization estimates are displayed in columns 5 to 8 of Table 1. Again, 
we find that decentralization is associated with a decrease of total public innovation investment 
by a similar magnitude (around -0.024 p.p. of the share of total R&D per each decentralization 
p.p.) On the other hand, the estimates suggest a higher negative correlation with the basic 
research intensity (around -1.372 p.p.), indicating potential larger effects on the composition of 
the public R&D bundle. 
Although the fiscal decentralization coefficients in the basic, applied and total R&D 
spending models seem small (absolute values below 0.03), their economic importance must be 
assessed in light of their relative magnitude compared to the budget dedicated to each of these 
activities.11 As displayed in Table B2 of Appendix B, R&D spending averaged 1.6 percent of the 
total public budget in our sample, while mean basic and applied R&D expenditures are around 
0.8 percent each. Therefore, the -0.023 and -0.024 parameters for decentralization in the ‘total 
R&D’ estimates mean that, caeteris paribus, we expect public funds dedicated to R&D to 
decrease approximately 1.6 percent of its original value for each additional p.p. of 
decentralization of a country’s revenue or expenditure. Taking such values into account, our 
estimates suggest that, in the case of a substantial government reform that decentralizes 
government expenditures or revenues, e.g., above 10 p.p., the expected reduction in publicly-
                                                          
11 The interpretation of parameters for basic research intensity estimates are more straightforward, as they indicate 
the estimated change of the share of basic R&D spending in the entire government innovation investment. 
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funded innovation activities is relevant (above 14 percent) and should not be overlooked, as the 
change in the composition of such activities, as they are likely to be more focused on applied 
R&D projects (around 9 percent lower basic research intensity). 
Results of the robustness checks are presented in Tables B4 to B11 of Appendix B (one 
for each dependent variable, considering both expenditure and revenue decentralization). We 
find that, in most cases, the sign and significance of the coefficients of the fiscal decentralization 
variables confirm the results of the main model. Estimates using the RAI indicators (column 1) 
present negative and statistically significant coefficients for regional policy and tax authority 
indices (used as alternative indicators of expenditure and revenue decentralization, respectively) 
only in the cases of basic and total R&D spending. The fixed effects model (column 2) also 
confirms our findings only for these cases, suggesting that the results for these two dependent 
variables are more robust. The estimates using only countries with a GDP per capita above US$ 
10,000 (column 3) also produce decentralization parameters that follow the sign and significance 
of the main model in all but one case (applied R&D and revenue decentralization—Table B9). 
And in most estimates, the robustness checks using the static version of the model and the 
alternative vector of control variables (columns 4 to 19) also yield coefficients of 
decentralization that are aligned with the results of the main model, suggesting that our findings 
are considerably robust to model specification. 
On the other hand, an important shortcoming is that the coefficients of some of the 
control variables (especially GDP per capita, urban population and internet access) neither 
present the expected sign nor remain stable across different robustness checks, and it is difficult 
to interpret their economic meaning. Such problems can be attributed to the small number of 
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observations and high variance of some variables, causing the coefficients to vary substantially, 
depending on the estimate and instrument count. We discuss this issue in further detail below. 
Discussion of the Findings, Limitations of the Study and Policy Implications 
The results of the empirical analysis provide support to the two propositions derived 
from the theoretical model. First, we find evidence that both expenditure and revenue 
decentralization are negatively and significantly correlated with the share of basic research in the 
public R&D bundle, suggesting that the decentralization level may affect the composition of the 
public innovation investment, in accordance with Proposition #1. In light of the literature on 
innovation spillovers, we argue that this result is mainly caused by higher levels of interregional 
externalities associated with basic research. As described in the theoretical model, subnational 
levels of government have incentives to invest less in this activity, as it is closer to the case of a 
global public good, with a high share of spillovers flowing to other regions. Governments at the 
national level, on the other hand, do not differentiate between such externalities and localized 
results, since they both affect national output, regardless of where research takes place.  
The empirical analysis also supports the hypothesis that total government spending on 
innovation is negatively affected by both revenue and expenditure decentralization. Although the 
theoretical model does not predict such outcome unambiguously, it is the most likely result, as 
expressed in Proposition #2. The theoretical model explains the economic drivers of this result: 
interregional spillovers and state competition reduce the payoffs and incentives for state 
governments to invest in R&D (in comparison with the central government), in spite of the 
benefits of locally-performed research. This finding is at odds with the ‘race to the top’ 
hypothesis suggested by the literature on fiscal decentralization and composition of public 
budget (Keen and Marchand 1997). Our study suggests that the incentives of regional 
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governments to spend more on productive activities to attract capital (Grisorio and Prota 2015; 
Sacchi and Salotti 2016) can be offset by considerable levels of interregional spillovers in the 
case of ST&I activities.  
Overall, the results provide supporting evidence to the general idea that the level of fiscal 
decentralization of a country is correlated and can affect public innovation spending. The results 
are in line with previous research showing that innovation presents high levels of spillovers that 
are not geographically bounded (Bernstein and Nadiri 1989; Bloom, Schankerman and Van 
Reenen 2013) and that basic research yields more results that are not internalized within regions 
(Funk 2002). 
However, this empirical analysis has limitations (many of which have been pointed out 
throughout the paper), which means that the evidence presented must be considered with proper 
caution. The main limitations include the size of the dataset and the potential weaknesses of the 
indicators used to test the hypotheses. The availability of data for a small number of countries 
affects the significance of the coefficients, as the two-step GMM estimator produces better 
results with a large number of groups (Roodman 2006). Still, the sign and significance of the 
decentralization coefficients are considerably robust (especially in the cases of basic and total 
R&D spending). However, we do not find a stable set of coefficients for some of the control 
variables, suggesting that they are sensitive to model specification or to the sample size used for 
the analysis. In addition, the sample does not include countries that are important cases to discuss 
the effects of decentralization (such as the U.S., China and India). Again, future research may be 
able to include these economies. Besides, the indicators used for fiscal decentralization—and 
which have been commonly used in the vast literature on the impacts of decentralization 
(Martinez-Vazquez, Lago-Peñas and Sacchi 2017)—do not necessarily reflect the division of 
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government functions in fostering or investing in science and technology activities. Finally, 
although this empirical analysis relies on the best available data at country level, the propositions 
derived from the theoretical model are based on the idea that national and regional governments 
have different solutions to their maximization problems. For this reason, testing the propositions 
distinguishing between both government levels (as data on R&D public spending become 
available) would be an important extension of this study. 
Acknowledging these limitations, this paper still provides a first argument and pretty 
robust evidence of the link between fiscal decentralization and public R&D, a novel finding and 
relevant contribution to both the fiscal decentralization and innovation policy literature. It opens 
a research agenda for future studies to obtain additional data, overcome the mentioned 
shortcomings and test the proposed hypotheses or suggest new ones. 
Two main relevant policy implications follow from our findings. First, deepening fiscal 
decentralization should be considered along with measures to compensate for the expected 
decreases in innovation spending. Our results suggest that this reduction can be large in the case 
of a substantial decentralization reform, providing a first estimate of its magnitude to be 
considered for policy analysis. The literature indicates different paths to address this problem, 
including a system of taxes and subsidies to compensate for public R&D investment at the state 
level (Oates 2008a) and Coase-type bargaining between provinces (Hulten and Schwab 1997). 
The second main implication refers to the roles and responsibilities of different levels of 
government in the design of national strategies for ST&I. The division of functions—or 
expenditure assignments—is a central topic to the design of fiscal decentralization systems and 
emphasized early in Oates’s decentralization theorem. Our findings suggest that, in light of 
different levels of interregional spillovers, the responsibility to finance or carry out basic 
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research should be higher for central levels of governments, leaving state authorities with the 
role of promoting more applied research and development. 
Concluding Remarks 
In the last decades, a large literature has presented evidence of the benefits of fiscal 
decentralization in a number of policy areas, including education (Faguet 2004), health services 
(Habibi et al. 2003) and infrastructure (Kappeler and Välilä 2008). This paper discusses the 
relation between fiscal decentralization and spending on public R&D, a topic that has not been 
properly addressed by this literature. It contributes to the existing knowledge by explaining how 
decentralization may affect the size and composition of public innovation investment.  
We present a model of a closed economy where states compete for capital investment 
and public innovation spending improves production technology locally, but part of its results 
flows to other regions. Based on this theoretical framework, we hypothesize that decentralized 
governments dedicate a smaller share of their R&D budget to basic research and that their 
overall innovation investments are smaller in most cases. Such propositions are tested through a 
novel empirical analysis using panel data across countries. The results provide empirical support 
to the mentioned hypotheses, as we find evidence that higher levels of both expenditure and 
revenue decentralization are associated with a lower intensity of basic research in public R&D 
and with a lower level of R&D spending  
The empirical investigation, however, has important limitations because of the small size 
of the dataset, shortcomings of the indicators used for fiscal decentralization and absence of data 
of R&D spending at the state level. For these reasons, this paper represents a first investigation 
on the subject, opening a promising research agenda on the links between fiscal decentralization 
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and innovation policy. As more and better data become available, future studies can improve the 
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Appendix A. Theoretical Model 
Basic Setup 
We consider a model with discrete time periods (t = 1, 2, ...m) and a closed economy 
divided in a large number of n symmetric regions, with only one homogeneous final good sold at 
the same competitive price (set at one for simplicity) and produced by n firms, one located in 
each region. We abstract from changes in population by assuming a constant number of 
uniformly distributed and non-mobile individuals (Oates and Schwab 1988). Capital, on the other 
hand, is perfectly mobile across jurisdictions, and it is allocated by its owners in each period to 
maximize earnings. The total stock of capital in this society (?̅?) is fixed in the short run (Oates 
and Schwab 1988, Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986), and its ownership is evenly distributed 
among all individuals, so that constituents of each region own ?̅?/𝑛 units of capital. Gross 
regional output in region i at period t depends on the capital kit invested in the firm located 
therein and on the production technology level Ait of each firm, following a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function.  
Firms compete to attract capital by paying an interest rate rt (0 < rt <1). In addition, 
firms have to pay taxes that are levied on each unit of capital invested in the respective period, 
according to a tax rate zit set by the government.
1 As suggested by Dhillon, Wooders, and 
Zissimos (2007), taxes are levied on capital used within the jurisdiction (‘destination basis’), 
regardless of its origin. The value of firms’ output that is not used to pay interest and taxes adds 
to the income of the respective region.  
                                                          
1 This tax base was chosen to highlight the state competition and the tradeoff between tax cost and improved product 
of capital as a result of technological improvement. This choice, however, is not critical to the conclusions of the 
model. A similar tax base was also used in previous models (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Oates and Schwab 
1988, Keen and Marchand 1997). 
 
35 
In this scenario, the net income of a region is given by the gross output minus taxes and 




1−𝛼 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡(𝑧𝑖𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡) + (?̅?/𝑛)𝑟𝑡;  0 < 𝛼 < 1 (A1) 
As Equation A1 provides for diminishing returns of factors, firms will take additional 
capital up to the point where its marginal product net of taxes equals its cost (the applicable 









− 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 (A2) 
Both the central and regional public budgets (Git) are balanced, so there is no public 
savings or deficit,2 and they are entirely spent in public R&D investment. We assume that the 
central government spends all taxes in the same region where they are collected, so we can 
abstract from regional transfers. The public spending constraint for each region in each period is 
therefore: 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑖𝑡   (A3) 
 Firms in all regions begin at the same technology level Ai,t-1, so we do not have to 
consider initial regional disparities. Their state of technology evolves according to (a) the 
investment made by the government in R&D within the region (Git), (b) the composition of 
public R&D spending, and (c) knowledge spillovers captured from R&D performed in all other 
regions (h(.)), as presented in Equation A4. R&D is broadly divided in basic and applied research 
(Morales 2004, Park 1998) according to the variable bit (0 < bit < 1), that informs the share of 
                                                          
2 This is a standard assumption used strictly for convenience in similar models (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, 
Dhillon, Wooders, and Zissimos 2007). 
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public R&D devoted to basic research as set by the government. Similarly, spillovers from other 
regions can be divided in basic and applied knowledge. In order to preserve the tractability and 
simplicity of the model, spillovers only affect the technology state directly, with no second order 
impacts on the results of locally-performed R&D. 
∆𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑓(𝑏𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝐺𝐽𝑡ℎ(𝑏𝐽𝑡)
𝑛−1
𝐽=1 ;  𝐽 ≠ 𝑖  (A4) 
The main distinction between basic and applied research considered herein is that basic 
research generates the knowledge necessary for innovations, but it does not improve the 
technology by itself, so further applied research is required to apply such knowledge to the 
production process (Auerswald et al. 2003, Morales 2004). Investment in applied research, on 
the other hand, is a sufficient condition to improve technology, but its productivity and results 
are improved by basic research knowledge. This description suggests the following functional 
form for the R&D productivity factor:3  
𝑓( 𝑏𝑖𝑡) = (1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡)(𝜃(1 − 𝑠𝐴) + 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝛾(1 − 𝑠𝐵))  (A5) 
where  
𝛾 > 𝜃 > 0    (A5a) 
𝑠𝐵 > 𝑠𝐴 > 0    (A5b) 
The positive parameter θ represents the productivity of applied research, γ is the 
contribution of basic research to productivity improvement (the inequality in Equation A5a 
represents the productivity increase of applied R&D caused by basic research). 𝑠𝐵 and 𝑠𝐴 are the 
levels of interregional spillovers of basic and applied research, respectively. Based on the 
literature discussed previously, we assume that interjurisdictional spillovers represent a higher 
                                                          
3 This functional form is based on the specification of basic and applied research suggested by Morales (2004) and 
the effect of spillovers defined by Feidler and Staal (2012). 
 
37 
share of results in the case of basic research (Equation 5b), both because it yields more 
knowledge externalities in general (i.e., the share of results internalized by the R&D-performing 
firm or institution is smaller), and because a larger share of such externalities spreads 
geographically, comparing to the case of applied research (Nelson 1959, Gersbach and Schneider 
2015, Funk 2002). 
In addition, these parameters take the same value for all regions,4 and spillovers are 
equally distributed among all regions (other than the one producing them), so that each receives 
an equal share of externalities arising from R&D performed in all other n - 1 jurisdictions. As 
regions are assumed to be similar, the spillover factor in Equation A4 can be simplified, as 
presented in Equation A6. 
∑ 𝐺𝐽𝑡ℎ(𝑏𝐽𝑡)
𝑛−1
𝐽=1 = ∑ 𝐺𝐽𝑡 ((
1
𝑛−1
) (1 − 𝑏𝐽𝑡) (𝜃(𝑠𝐴) + 𝛾𝑏𝐽𝑡(𝑠𝐵)))
𝑛−1
𝐽=1 =  (A6) 
𝐺𝑗𝑡(1 − 𝑏𝑗𝑡)(𝜃(𝑠𝐴) + 𝛾𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝑠𝐵)); 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 
The Regional Government Decision 
We first consider the case of complete decentralization, where regional governments are 
the only tax authorities and have full discretion to decide on their spending. The government 
aims to maximize net local income, as provided in Equation A1. To achieve this goal, it taxes 
locally-invested capital and spends its budget on public R&D, determining the composition of its 
investment bundle. 
While establishing the applicable tax rate, regional governments have to consider the 
impact of their decisions on capital investment. As capital is perfectly mobile and there is a large 
                                                          
4 This assumption would be relaxed in case of more than one final good or production sector (which implies 
different technologies and spillover levels), or if regions had different industrial property regimes for protection of 
invention (that could also affect externalities). These extensions are not dealt with herein. 
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number of communities, competition equalizes such rate among all jurisdictions (Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski 1986, Dhillon, Wooders, and Zissimos 2007), so firms and governments are ‘price 
takers’ (Equation A7). Considering the relation between marginal product of capital, taxes and 
interest rates expressed in Equation A2, the exogenous interest rate determines the capital 
constraint of the regional government’s maximization problem (Equation A8): 
𝑟𝑡 = ?̅?






− 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = ?̅?
𝑅  (A8) 
The regional government trade-off concerning the tax rate can be described as follows: 
while taxes provide funding for public R&D that improves the production technology (Ait) and 
increases output (Equation A4), they negatively impact the net income through two effects: (a) 
by reducing the available income (Equation A1); and (b) by reducing the marginal product of 
capital (Equation A2). The level of taxation is then chosen to maximize local net income 
according to Equation A1, subject to the budget and capital constraints in Equations A3 and A8, 
and the expected technology improvement in the province (Equation A4). Interregional 
knowledge spillovers affect the regional government’s decision because they reduce the share of 
benefits arising from such improvement that stays within the region, as returns that flow 
elsewhere are not considered in the maximization problem of subnational authorities. Such effect 
is represented by the spillover parameters (sA and sB) in the regional R&D productivity factor 
(𝑓𝑖
𝑅) in Equation A5, that reduce the returns of the technological development (Equation A4). 
Taking the first order conditions and solving the system of equations, we find the 





= 0 → 𝑧𝑖
𝑅∗ = ((1 − 𝛼)𝑓𝑖
𝑅∗?̅?𝑅)
1−𝛼




𝑅∗ = (1 − 𝑏𝑖
𝑅∗) (𝜃(1 − 𝑠𝐴) + 𝛾𝑏𝑖
𝑅∗(1 − 𝑠𝐵)) (A9a) 
The first term on the right side of Equation A9 represents the optimal marginal product 
of capital, that is affected both by the technology level and the applicable interest rate. The R&D 
productivity factor (𝑓𝑖
𝑅) positively affects the optimal choice of public innovation investment, 
indicating the negative effect of interjurisdictional spillovers. Equation A9 also informs how the 
optimal tax rate is affected by competition in the capital market. Such impact is two-folded and 
non-linear, as suggested by the presence of the interest rate (?̅?𝑅) in both terms on the right side of 
the equation. On the one hand, state competition limits the tax rate: an interest rate increase 
would have to be partially offset by a reduction of taxes by regional governments, to avoid 
capital flight and decrease of output. But part of such increase is compensated by maintaining 
public R&D spending, that raises the gross marginal product of capital. As a result, the tax 
reduction is not equivalent to the interest rate increase.  
To decide on the composition of the public R&D bundle, the government considers the 
expected technology improvement caused by additional units of basic and applied research, and 
the respective impact on output. Again, spillovers affect such decision because part of the new 
developed technology cannot be appropriated and therefore does not generate additional income 
in the region. The optimal composition of the public R&D bundle (𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑅∗) is obtained by 
maximizing the technology level in Equation A4 with respect to the share of basic research (bit).
5 
The optimal choice (𝑏𝑖
𝑅∗) displayed in Equation A8 is positively correlated with the contribution 
of basic research (γ), and negatively correlated with the applied research productivity parameter 
                                                          
5 It can be proved algebraically that 
𝜕𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑓𝑅
> 0 for all non-negative values of 𝑧𝑖
𝑅, so an increase in the technology 
parameter 𝑓𝑖
∗ positively affects output in all relevant cases. 
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(θ). As expected, the influence of these factors is reduced by the respective interjurisdictional 












The Central Government Decision 
We now consider the decision of the central government in a scenario of total 
centralization of both the tax policy and public expenditure. In this case, the government aims to 
maximize net national income (yt
C). To achieve this goal, it sets a single applicable tax rate and 
composition of the public R&D bundle for all regions (zit=zjt=zt and bit=bjt=bt). As all capital is 
owned by and equally distributed to individuals within the country, capital compensation 
payments are offset by the respective interest revenue. Considering the assumption of similar 
regions, the net national income can be expressed using the case of a representative region, so we 
can compare the optimal choices of the central government and of regional authorities. 
𝑦𝑡
𝐶 = ∑ (𝑘𝐼𝑡
𝛼 𝐴𝐼𝑡




1−𝛼 − 𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑖𝑡) ;  𝑖 ∈ 𝐼 (A11) 
The first main difference between the centralized and decentralized cases is the capital 
constraint. For the central government, the level of capital is constrained only by the total stock 
available in the economy (?̅?), assumed to be fixed in the short run. As subnational governments 
do not have any policy instrument to compete, capital is equally invested across all regions: 




𝑖=0  (A12) 
The second difference is the technology function. The central government does not 
differentiate between interjurisdictional knowledge spillovers and internal (or local) results, as 
the value that does not accrue to the firm in one region improves the production technology in all 
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others, so there is no loss (or gain) at the national level. This effect is represented by the sum of 
all regional outputs in Equation A11. A different way to understand this is to apply the national 
rates to the spillover and R&D productivity functions (Equations A5 and A6), and substitute it in 
the R&D Equation A4. The similar regions assumption ensures that the value of externalities 
flowing out of each jurisdiction is equivalent to spillovers captured from all other areas, and also 
that the technology development is the same in all regions (Ait=Ajt=At). This leads to the 
technology improvement function presented in Equation 13, which does not contain the 
spillovers parameters: 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑓(𝑏𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝐺𝐽𝑡ℎ(𝑏𝐽𝑡)
𝑛−1
𝐽=1 = 𝐴𝑡−1 + (?̅? 𝑛⁄ )𝑧𝑡(1 − 𝑏𝑖𝑡)(𝜃 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝛾)  (A13) 
The optimal level of taxation (𝑧𝑡
𝐶∗) is obtained by maximizing the national output in 
Equation A11, subject to the capital constraint and the expected technology improvement 
(Equations A12 and A13, respectively). The optimal rate (displayed in Equation A14) increases 
both with capital availability and the R&D productivity factor (as it raises the marginal product 
of public innovation), and it decreases with the initial level of technology (because of 












𝑓𝐶∗ = (1 − 𝑏𝐶∗)(𝜃 + 𝛾𝑏𝐶∗)   (A14a) 
A third feature that distinguishes the centralized government case is the compensation 
paid to capital owners. Although firms in different regions still compete for capital, they are 
subject to the same marginal product of capital (because they have the same technology level) 
and tax rate. In this scenario, the applicable interest rate is a function of total capital availability 
and of the tax rate set by the central government, as presented in Equation A15. This rate tends to 
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be lower than the one in the decentralized case, as there is no state competition pushing it 
upward. 







− 𝑧𝐶∗ =  
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
(𝑓𝐶∗)(?̅? 𝑛⁄ )
− (𝑓𝐶∗(1 − 𝛼))
1−𝛼
𝛼 (1 − 2𝛼)  (A15) 
where 
𝑟𝐶∗ < ?̅?𝑅 (A15a) 
If we substitute such value in Equation A14, we obtain a different expression for optimal 
taxes (Equation A16), that can be directly compared to the regional government decision in 
Equation A9). The first term on the right side of Equation A16 represents the marginal product 
of capital, that is not affected by the applicable interest rate (unlike the decentralized government 
case). 
𝑧𝐶∗ = 𝛼(𝑓𝐶∗(1 − 𝛼))
1−𝛼
𝛼 − 𝑟𝐶∗ (A16) 
The central government’s optimal choice for the composition of the public R&D bundle 
is the one that maximizes technological development in Equation A13, and, consequently, net 
national output. Equation A17 follows closely the specification of the best choice of the 
decentralized government (Equation A10), but excluding the parameters of externalities that flow 
to other provinces. 
𝜕𝐴𝑡
𝜕𝑏𝑡







Effects of Decentralization 
Proposition 1: 𝑏𝐶∗ > 𝑏𝑅∗. All other things constant, a higher level of fiscal 
decentralization should lead to a lower intensity of basic research within the public R&D 
bundle, as a lower share of its results stays within the region.  
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This proposition can be derived from the optimal choices of share of basic research 
presented in Equations A10 and A17. Considering the assumptions presented in Equations A5a 
(basic research increases applied R&D productivity) and A5b (higher levels of interregional 
externalities of basic research), it follows that 𝑏𝐶∗ > 𝑏𝑅∗. The central government decision is not 
affected by interregional externalities (parameters sA and sB), as they positively affect the overall 
country income. The regional government, on the other hand, weights the productivity 
parameters of each type of R&D by the respective levels of spillovers, as suggested by Equation 
A10. Subnational authorities choose a lower share of basic research because a lower proportion 
of the results stays within the region. 
Proposition 2: 𝑧𝐶∗ > 𝑧𝑅∗. ‘Ceteris paribus’, a higher level of fiscal decentralization 
should lead to a lower level of public spending on innovation, as a consequence of knowledge 
spillovers (that reduce regional governments’ incentives to invest in R&D) and of state 
competition to attract capital (that limits the subnational government budget), in spite of the 
contribution of technology to the regional product.  
The optimal choices for taxation and R&D investment are presented in Equations A9 
(regional government) and A16 (central government). The decisions are mostly based on three 
forces: regional spillovers, the negative impact of taxes (on capital investment and available 
income), and the positive impact of public R&D on the production technology. Regional 
spillovers reduce the R&D productivity factor and regional governments’ incentives to invest in 
R&D (Equation A9a), while the same effect is not observed for the central government 
(Equation A14a) - it is easy to see that 𝑓𝐶∗ > 𝑓𝑅∗. In addition, taxes influence the level of capital 
investment when they are defined at the regional level, as suggested by presence of the interest 
rate parameter in Equation A9. They reduce the marginal product of capital (Equation A8), 
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discouraging capital investment in the region and acting as a limit to government revenue and 
spending.6 But public R&D paid by taxes acts a counterforce to this effect, as it improves 
technology and increases production and capital earnings. In the case of centralized setup 
(Equation A16), competition for capital investment does not influence the government decision, 
as taxes are equally applicable to all regions. 
It is not possible to state unambiguously in which case the public R&D investment will 
be higher, as this depends on the value of the parameters in Equations A9 (𝑧𝑅∗) and A16 (𝑧𝐶∗). 
Our model, therefore, confirms the argument presented by Kappeler and Välilä (2008) that the 
final outcome cannot be determined theoretically a priori. Still, we understand that, in most 
cases, the negative effects of interregional spillovers and state competition on R&D spending 
should overcome the positive incentives of technological innovation, leading to a lower 
investment level in the case of a decentralized authority. 
                                                          




Appendix B. Variables and Robustness Checks of the Empirical Analysis 
Table B1. List, Definition and Source of the Variables Used in the Empirical Study 
Dependent Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Public spending 
on basic R&D  
Share of basic research spending in the total public budget 
IMF Government  









Share of overall R&D spending (including basic research, applied 
research and development) in the public budget 
Share of basic 
research in 
public R&D 
Share of basic research in the public R&D budget 
Fiscal Decentralization Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Expenditure 
Decentralization 
Share of subnational levels of government in general public 
spending 
IMF Government  




Share of subnational levels of government (excluded 
intergovernmental grants) in general public revenue  
Decentralization 
Imbalance 
Difference between expenditure and revenue decentralization 
levels 
Other Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition Source 






GDP per capita 
(ll) 
GDP per capita- constant 2010 US$ (log-linearized) 
Land area Land area (sq. km) 
Labor force (ll) Labor force, total (log-linearized) 
Unemployment Unemployment, total (share of total labor force unemployed*100) 
Population 
density 
Population density (people per sq. km of land area) 
Urban pop. Urban population (as share of total population*100) 
Internet access Individuals using the Internet (as share of total population*100) 
Patent app. per 
capita 
Patent applications by residents divided by total population 
Trade*high-tech. 
exports 
Interaction term: trade (sum of exports and imports of goods and services 
as a share of GDP) multiplied by high-technology exports (as a share of 
manufactured exports) 
Gov. 
expenditure as % 
of GDP 
Size of government (public expenditure as share of country’s GDP*100) 






“Average of mean years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of 
schooling (of children), both expressed as an index obtained by scaling 









Dummy for left-wing orientation of the national chief executive party 
with respect to economic policy. “Left: for parties that are defined as 
communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing” (Cruz, Keefer, and 
Scartascini 2018). 









Dummy for right-wing orientation of the national chief executive party 
with respect to economic policy. “Right: for parties that are defined as 




Dummy for presidential system, i.e., “systems with unelected 
executives” or “Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by 
an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in 




Dummy for parliamentary system, i.e., “countries in which the 
legislature elects the chief executive […], with the following exception: 
if that assembly or group cannot easily recall him […]” (Cruz, Keefer, 
and Scartascini 2018). 
EU country 
dummy 
Dummy for member countries of the European Union (on August 2019) 
European Union 
(2019) 
Alternative Indicators for Fiscal Decentralization 
Variable Definition Source 
Regional government 
policy authority 
The range of policies for which a regional 
government is responsible. The index ranges 
from 0 to 4, according to the classification 
described in the RAI Codebook (Hooghe et al. 
2016). Regional Authority Index 
(Hooghe et al. 2016) 
Regional government 
tax authority 
The extent to which a regional government can 
independently tax its population. The index 
ranges from 0 to 4, according to the 
classification described in the RAI Codebook 
(Hooghe et al. 2016). 
a Sum of all values labeled as ‘applied R&D’ (applied research and development) for all broad spending categories. 
b Dummy variable for center orientation of the chief executive party not included to avoid perfect collinearity. 




Table B2. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Empirical Study 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. 
Public spending on basic R&D  433 0.008 0.007 
Public spending on applied R&D 433 0.008 0.006 
Total public R&D spending 433 0.016 0.009 
Share of basic research in public R&D 433 0.478 0.320 
Expenditure Decentralization 433 0.273 0.131 
Revenue Decentralization 433 0.136 0.085 
Decentralization Imbalance 433 -0.136 0.083 
GDP (ll) 433 26.103 1.539 
GDP per capita (ll) 433 10.113 0.792 
Land area 433 2.62e+05 8.57e+05 
Labor force (ll) 433 15.277 1.264 
Unemployment 433 8.791 4.841 
Population density 433 149.257 201.207 
Urban pop. 433 71.434 13.100 
Internet access 433 62.167 23.976 
Patent applications per capita 433 0.0002 0.0004 
Trade*high-tech. exports 433 1696.292 2056.900 
Gov. expenditure as % of GDP 433 44.194 7.684 
Education index 433 0.819 0.066 
Party orientation: left wing 433 0.316 0.466 
Party orientation: right wing 433 0.370 0.483 
Pol. system: presidential 433 0.136 0.343 
Pol. System: parliamentary 433 0.815 0.389 
EU country dummy 433 0.838 0.369 
Regional government policy authority 217 1.560 1.373 
Regional government tax authority 217 1.023 1.373 
Source: calculated by the authors based on IMF (2018); WB (2019); UNDP (2018); Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini (2018); Hooghe et al. (2016); 




Table B3. List of Countries and Years Considered in the Empirical Study; 




on basic R&D 
Mean public 
spending 




Mean share of 
basic research in public 
R&D 
Albania 2014-2015  0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 
Austria 2009-2017 0.010 0.016 0.025 0.390 
Belgium 2004-2017 0.020 0.004 0.024 0.816 
Bulgaria 1996, 2009-2014 0.006 0.000 0.006 1.000 
Croatia 2003-2017 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.644 
Cyprus 2007-2010, 2012-2017 0.000 0.014 0.014 0.000 
Czech Republic 2009-2017 0.005 0.022 0.026 0.177 
Denmark 1999-2000, 2009-2017 0.027 0.003 0.030 0.890 
El Salvador 2015-2017 0.000 0.010 0.010 0.000 
Estonia 1996-1997, 2007-2016  0.011 0.014 0.025 0.440 
Finland 2002-2017 0.017 0.011 0.028 0.615 
France 1996-2017 0.009 0.017 0.026 0.332 




0.009 0.003 0.013 0.726 
Iceland 2014-2016 0.002 0.009 0.011 0.217 
Ireland 1996-2017 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.405 
Israel 2014-2017 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.333 
Italy 2007-2011, 2014, 2016-2017 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.538 
Japan 2006-2017 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.340 
Kazakhstan 2011, 2013-2017 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.667 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2015-2017  0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 
Latvia 2002-2017  0.008 0.002 0.010 0.816 
Lithuania 2001-2017  0.004 0.008 0.012 0.388 
Luxembourg 2015-2017 0.010 0.012 0.022 0.463 
Malta 2008-2015 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.000 
Moldova 2016 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.500 
Mongolia 2017 0.000 0.040 0.040 0.000 
Netherlands 1996-2017 0.012 0.011 0.023 0.515 
Norway 1996-2017 0.011 0.011 0.022 0.494 




0.005 0.010 0.015 0.362 





2015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Slovak Republic 2002-2017 0.014 0.000 0.014 1.000 
Slovenia 2000-2011 0.012 0.010 0.022 0.553 
South Africa 2013-2017 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.750 
Spain 2009-2017 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.522 
Sweden 2002-2017 0.027 0.003 0.030 0.897 
Thailand 2014, 2016 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 
Turkey 2016-2017 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.667 
Ukraine 2015-2017 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 
United Kingdom 2008-2017 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.000 
Source: calculated by the authors based on IMF (2018); WB (2019); UNDP (2018); Cruz, Keefer, and Scartascini (2018); Hooghe et al. (2016); 
and European Union (2019) 
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Table B4. Robustness Check: Expenditure Decentralization; 















Alternative specifications of the vector of control variables (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.631*** 0.72*** 0.88***  0.93*** 0.87*** 0.99*** 0.94*** 0.89*** 0.96*** 0.99*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 0.98*** 0.93*** 0.94*** 0.99*** 0.95*** 
(0.072) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Decentralization imbalance  0.02*** 0.02*** -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00***  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing 0.000 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00   
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
0.000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***   
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Urban pop. 0.000 -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00***    
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  -0.000 -0.00 0.00* -0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   0.01 -0.01 0.00** 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.00** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00**      
  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Pol. System: parliamentary -0.000 -0.00 0.00*** 0.01** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00***      
(0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Patent app. per capita -1.321 0.78 7.57*** 0.96 0.78 0.63 -1.07 3.52*** 1.05** -0.07 0.48 1.25 1.73***       
(3.193) (1.74) (1.53) (1.29) (1.33) (2.34) (0.89) (0.47) (0.42) (0.44) (0.69) (0.82) (0.42)       
Unemployment  0.000*** 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00***        
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) 0.010 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*         
(0.012) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Internet access -0.000 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00***          
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) -0.004 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00***           
(0.008) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
Education index 0.002 0.00 0.00 -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01* 0.00 -0.01***            
(0.008) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.007 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00             
(0.010) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
Population density -0.000 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00              
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.000** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***               
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   0.00 0.00                
  (0.01) (0.00)                
Regional government 
policy authority 
-0.005***                   
(0.002)                   
Constant -0.037 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.01** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
(0.191) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 217 433 406 459 433 433 433 433 440 440 440 440 540 570 570 570 570 625 632 
Number of countries 28 42 33 44 42 42 42 42 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 46 48 49 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments.  
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Table B5. Robustness Check: Expenditure Decentralization;  















Alternative Specifications of the main model (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.569*** 0.63*** 0.48***  0.39*** 0.41*** 0.50*** 0.54*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.65*** 0.68*** 0.92*** 0.87*** 1.02*** 1.05*** 
(0.074) (0.04) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
Fiscal decentralization  0.00 -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Decentralization imbalance  -0.01 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** 0.00*** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00** -0.00*** 0.00* 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing -0.001 -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
-0.001 -0.00 0.00 0.00*** -0.00* 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Urban pop. -0.000 -0.00** 0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00    
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  0.000 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   -0.04*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* -0.00***      
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Pol. System: parliamentary 0.000 0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00**      
(0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Patent app. per capita 0.399 -0.81 1.90 11.71*** -2.74 -6.46*** -2.07 -0.45 1.15 -2.97** -1.60 -0.04 1.47       
(4.423) (2.35) (2.84) (1.61) (2.71) (2.31) (1.50) (1.44) (0.80) (1.17) (1.12) (1.04) (1.20)       
Unemployment  -0.000 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***        
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) 0.011 -0.01 0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.01** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00         
(0.016) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Internet access 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00***          
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) -0.012 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00***           
(0.011) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
Education index -0.004 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02* -0.02* -0.03*** -0.03***            
(0.012) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.007 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.01*** 0.01***             
(0.014) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)             
Population density 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***              
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.000 -0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00               
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   0.00 -0.01***                
  (0.00) (0.00)                
Regional government 
policy authority 
0.001                   
(0.002)                   
Constant -0.093 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04*** -0.03** -0.01 -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00* -0.00 
(0.261) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 217 433 406 459 433 433 433 433 440 440 440 440 540 570 570 570 570 625 632 
Number of countries 28 42 33 44 42 42 42 42 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 46 48 49 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments.  
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Table B6. Robustness Check: Expenditure Decentralization; 















Alternative Specifications of the main model (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.453*** 0.57*** 0.65***  0.52*** 0.56*** 0.60*** 0.53*** 0.62*** 0.73*** 0.72*** 0.67*** 0.63*** 0.82*** 0.73*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 1.01*** 0.94*** 
(0.076) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.02** -0.03*** 0.01 -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01* -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Decentralization imbalance  0.02 0.04*** -0.02 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing -0.000 -0.00 0.00 0.00* -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
-0.001 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Urban pop. -0.000 -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00*** 0.00***    
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  0.000 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00* -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00* -0.00     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   -0.01 -0.01*** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00* -0.01*** -0.01***      
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Pol. System: parliamentary 0.001 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00      
(0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Patent app. per capita -1.063 0.36 -2.11 1.03 -1.28 1.03 -3.71 -1.18 1.97 -4.42 -4.87*** -3.09 0.08       
(4.836) (2.70) (4.77) (3.39) (3.10) (2.28) (3.16) (3.50) (3.09) (2.74) (1.58) (2.31) (1.79)       
Unemployment  0.000** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***        
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) 0.023 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 0.00** -0.00         
(0.017) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Internet access -0.000 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00***          
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) -0.013 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01** -0.00**           
(0.012) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)           
Education index -0.005 0.01 0.00 0.03** -0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.00            
(0.013) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.014 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01*** 0.00*** -0.01             
(0.015) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)             
Population density -0.000 0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00              
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.000** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00               
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   0.02*** -0.01*                
  (0.01) (0.00)                
Regional government 
policy authority 
-0.006**                   
(0.003)                   
Constant -0.223 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00* -0.01*** -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00** 
(0.288) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 217 433 406 459 433 433 433 433 440 440 440 440 540 570 570 570 570 625 632 
Number of countries 28 42 33 44 42 42 42 42 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 46 48 49 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments.  
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Table B7. Robustness Check: Expenditure Decentralization;  















Alternative Specifications of the main model (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.684*** 0.78*** 0.80***  0.76*** 0.75*** 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.86*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 0.94*** 0.85*** 
(0.069) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.51 -1.22*** -0.32 -0.76** -0.41 -0.77*** -0.75*** -0.70*** -0.76*** -0.51*** -0.24** 0.20 -0.09 -0.07 -0.98*** -1.00*** 0.08*** 0.23*** 
 (0.45) (0.22) (1.10) (0.31) (0.51) (0.27) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) (0.14) (0.31) (0.22) (0.03) (0.05) 
Decentralization imbalance  0.66 1.53*** -0.26 1.11** 0.82 1.18*** 1.07*** 1.00*** 1.02*** 0.78*** 0.53** 0.15 0.65** 0.75*** 1.87*** 1.70*** -0.04 0.08 
 (0.46) (0.18) (1.23) (0.46) (0.65) (0.42) (0.35) (0.34) (0.29) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.29) (0.17) (0.39) (0.30) (0.09) (0.08) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing 0.028 0.01 -0.04* -0.08 -0.02* -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02   
(0.034) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
0.021 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.04* -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.00   
(0.033) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)   
Urban pop. 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00    
(0.009) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  -0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   -0.60 0.54 0.21 0.59** 0.49** 0.36** 0.35*** 0.27** 0.11 -0.03 0.18*** 0.15*      
  (0.41) (0.35) (0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.16) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08)      
Pol. System: parliamentary -0.043 -0.05 0.16 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.19* 0.19* 0.17 0.11 0.20*** 0.18***      
(0.200) (0.07) (0.12) (0.39) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)      
Patent app. per capita 44.233 79.08 214.68 -400.06 149.30 233.46* -63.21 -10.10 -12.81 -90.40* -56.33 -38.76 -132.39**       
(241.256) (124.89) (161.85) (323.87) (118.07) (141.05) (84.59) (73.80) (78.64) (48.28) (48.61) (35.96) (53.19)       
Unemployment  0.006 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00**        
(0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) -0.004 -0.11 -0.00 -0.43 0.14 0.97** -0.21 0.12** 0.09*** 0.04** 0.04***         
(0.877) (0.37) (0.01) (0.82) (0.29) (0.44) (0.27) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)         
Internet access -0.001 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00**          
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) 0.270 0.17 0.00 0.59 -0.20 -1.12** 0.21 -0.14** -0.09*           
(0.597) (0.31) (0.00) (0.88) (0.32) (0.48) (0.28) (0.07) (0.05)           
Education index 0.147 -0.20 0.00 -1.16 0.15 0.37 0.30 0.16            
(0.638) (0.37) (0.00) (1.40) (0.33) (0.40) (0.39) (0.28)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.086 0.08 0.00 0.51 -0.04 -0.75* 0.29             
(0.768) (0.33) (0.00) (0.82) (0.24) (0.40) (0.24)             
Population density 0.000 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00**              
(0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.004 0.00 -0.00* -0.01 -0.00               
(0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   0.05 1.04***                
  (0.18) (0.29)                
Regional government 
policy authority 
-0.076                   
(0.120)                   
Constant 4.745 -1.77 0.00 -3.06 -0.76 -1.07 -1.03* -1.30*** -1.50*** -1.38*** -1.04*** -0.02 -0.18 -0.30*** -0.13** -0.07 0.10*** 0.00 -0.01 
(14.192) (6.68) (0.00) (2.52) (0.63) (0.66) (0.56) (0.48) (0.24) (0.47) (0.39) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.12) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
Observations 217 429 405 459 429 429 429 429 436 436 436 436 536 566 566 566 566 620 626 
Number of countries 28 41 33 44 41 41 41 41 44 44 44 44 45 45 45 45 45 47 48 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments.  
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Table B8. Robustness Check: Revenue Decentralization; 















Alternative Specifications of the main model (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.647*** 0.72*** 0.96***  0.87*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.97*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 
(0.076) (0.03) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00* -0.00** 0.00*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Decentralization imbalance  0.00 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00***  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing 0.000 -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00* 0.00***   
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
0.000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***   
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Urban pop. 0.000 -0.00** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***    
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  -0.000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00***      
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Pol. System: parliamentary -0.001 -0.00 0.00* 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00***      
(0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Patent app. per capita -2.026 0.78 -1.68 4.79** -1.13 0.73 1.12 1.62* 1.16** 1.13** -0.12 1.69*** 1.17***       
(3.211) (1.74) (2.32) (1.98) (1.24) (1.60) (1.14) (0.86) (0.54) (0.49) (0.60) (0.54) (0.37)       
Unemployment  0.000*** 0.00* 0.00** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***        
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) 0.013 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 -0.01** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00** 0.00**         
(0.012) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Internet access -0.000 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***          
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) -0.006 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00*** -0.00***           
(0.008) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
Education index 0.005 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01 -0.00            
(0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.010 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01***             
(0.010) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
Population density 0.000 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00              
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.000*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00               
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   -0.00 -0.00                
  (0.00) (0.00)                
Regional government tax 
authority 
-0.001**                   
(0.001)                   
Constant -0.055 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02* -0.04*** -0.03*** 0.00 -0.01*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** 
(0.196) (0.09) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 217 433 406 459 433 433 433 433 440 440 440 440 540 570 570 570 570 625 632 
Number of countries 28 42 33 44 42 42 42 42 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 46 48 49 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments.  
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Table B9. Robustness Check: Revenue Decentralization; 















Alternative Specifications of the main model (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.572*** 0.63*** 0.55***  0.35*** 0.51*** 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.53*** 0.56*** 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.95*** 0.85*** 1.01*** 0.95*** 
(0.074) (0.04) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fiscal decentralization  0.00 -0.01* -0.02** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Decentralization imbalance  -0.01 0.01* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00* -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing -0.001 -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00***   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
-0.001 -0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Urban pop. -0.000 -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00** -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00**    
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  0.000 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00***     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   -0.01 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*      
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Pol. System: parliamentary 0.000 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00      
(0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Patent app. per capita 0.603 -0.81 -2.15 1.83 -0.28 -2.12 0.27 0.22 -2.43** -3.01*** -4.02*** -1.22 -0.11       
(4.412) (2.35) (5.05) (4.31) (2.06) (2.72) (1.98) (0.96) (1.18) (1.03) (1.21) (1.10) (1.30)       
Unemployment  -0.000 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***        
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) 0.010 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01* 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***         
(0.016) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Internet access 0.000 0.00 -0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00***          
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) -0.011 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00*** -0.00           
(0.011) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)           
Education index -0.006 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.01 -0.02** -0.02***            
(0.012) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.006 0.01 0.00 0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.00             
(0.014) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)             
Population density 0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00**              
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.000 -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 -0.00*               
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   0.00 -0.01***                
  (0.01) (0.00)                
Regional government tax 
authority 
0.000                   
(0.001)                   
Constant -0.094 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.03*** 0.00 0.00 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
(0.262) (0.13) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 217 433 406 459 433 433 433 433 440 440 440 440 540 570 570 570 570 625 632 
Number of countries 28 42 33 44 42 42 42 42 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 46 48 49 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments.  
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Table B10. Robustness Check: Revenue Decentralization; 















Alternative Specifications of the main model (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.439*** 0.57*** 0.58***  0.51*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.66*** 0.61*** 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.80*** 0.70*** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.97*** 0.92*** 
(0.077) (0.04) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.02** -0.01** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.01 -0.01** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00* -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00*** 0.00** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Decentralization imbalance  -0.00 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00* -0.00* -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing -0.000 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
-0.001 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** 0.00 0.00   
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Urban pop. -0.000 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00    
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  0.000 -0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00* -0.00     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   -0.00 -0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01***      
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Pol. System: parliamentary 0.000 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00      
(0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
Patent app. per capita -1.948 0.36 0.03 -6.27 -2.72 -5.47* -4.39* -2.89 -4.05* -7.02*** -6.84** -3.91** -1.12       
(4.818) (2.70) (4.24) (4.52) (4.40) (3.25) (2.66) (2.88) (2.37) (2.14) (3.00) (1.58) (1.84)       
Unemployment  0.000** 0.00* 0.00 -0.00** -0.00 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00**        
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) 0.027 -0.00 0.01*** -0.00*** 0.00 0.01*** -0.00 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*         
(0.017) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)         
Internet access -0.000 -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***          
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) -0.015 -0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00** -0.01**           
(0.012) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)           
Education index -0.002 0.01 -0.00 0.04** -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00            
(0.013) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.017 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01** 0.00 0.00*             
(0.015) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
Population density -0.000 0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00              
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.000** -0.00*** -0.00 0.00** 0.00*               
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   0.02*** -0.01**                
  (0.01) (0.00)                
Regional government tax 
authority 
-0.002**                   
(0.001)                   
Constant -0.282 0.20 0.00 0.00 -0.08** -0.06** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05* -0.06*** -0.02* -0.00** 0.00* 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00* -0.00 
(0.291) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 217 433 406 459 433 433 433 433 440 440 440 440 540 570 570 570 570 625 632 
Number of countries 28 42 33 44 42 42 42 42 45 45 45 45 46 46 46 46 46 48 49 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments.  
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Table B11. Robustness Check: Revenue Decentralization; 















Alternative Specifications of the main model (system GMM) 
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dep. Var.(t-1) 0.688*** 0.78*** 0.78***  0.68*** 0.83*** 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.86*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.73*** 
(0.069) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Fiscal decentralization  -0.51 -1.02*** 0.05 -0.93** -1.38*** -0.84*** -0.93*** -0.80*** -0.61*** -0.53*** -0.29** 0.21 0.07 -0.01 -0.73*** -0.75*** 0.16*** 0.39*** 
 (0.45) (0.21) (0.65) (0.42) (0.30) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.04) (0.06) 
Decentralization imbalance  0.15 0.78*** -0.14 0.51* 0.61*** 0.17 0.38*** 0.44*** 0.31*** 0.22 0.29** 0.61*** 0.76*** 0.60*** 0.71*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.57*** 
 (0.22) (0.17) (0.39) (0.27) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Trade*high-tech. exports -0.000 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00***  
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
Party orientation: left wing 0.029 0.01 0.02 -0.13*** -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* -0.03** 0.01 -0.00   
(0.034) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Party orientation: right 
wing 
0.023 0.00 0.02 -0.11* -0.01 -0.03** -0.04** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03** -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.03*** -0.03** 0.01 0.01   
(0.033) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Urban pop. 0.006 0.00 0.00 0.02** 0.01** 0.01** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**    
(0.009) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Land area  -0.000 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00     
(0.000) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
Pol. system: presidential   -0.67** 0.21 0.44* 0.78*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.24*** 0.17*      
  (0.32) (0.22) (0.24) (0.20) (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)      
Pol. System: parliamentary -0.045 -0.05 0.02 0.24 0.08 0.23** 0.07 0.05 0.14* 0.16 0.17 0.16* 0.18** 0.15***      
(0.200) (0.07) (0.09) (0.20) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05)      
Patent app. per capita 31.647 79.08 -83.78 -166.29 93.02 -63.28 2.79 -14.82 -13.19 -74.71* 21.79 -38.25 -215.54**       
(240.576) (124.89) (141.10) (265.57) (85.86) (96.69) (58.70) (58.19) (69.52) (42.28) (48.37) (38.28) (92.17)       
Unemployment  0.006 0.00 0.01*** 0.01 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00**        
(0.005) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)        
GDP (ll) 0.035 -0.11 0.00 0.43 0.26 -0.01 0.14 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.02* 0.03***         
(0.876) (0.37) (0.00) (0.60) (0.28) (0.26) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)         
Internet access -0.001 -0.00* 0.00* -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00**          
(0.001) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)          
Labor force (ll) 0.226 0.17 0.00 -0.41 -0.34 0.03 -0.11 -0.12** -0.18***           
(0.593) (0.31) (0.00) (0.68) (0.29) (0.27) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05)           
Education index 0.230 -0.20 0.00 -0.33 -0.17 -0.10 0.18 -0.05            
(0.626) (0.37) (0.00) (0.96) (0.34) (0.22) (0.33) (0.29)            
GDP per capita (ll) -0.135 0.08 0.00 -0.46 -0.10 0.18 -0.03             
(0.764) (0.33) (0.00) (0.63) (0.26) (0.23) (0.14)             
Population density 0.000 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***              
(0.004) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)              
Gov. expenditure as % of 
GDP 
-0.004 0.00 -0.00** -0.01*** -0.00               
(0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)               
EU country dummy   0.16 0.97***                
  (0.15) (0.22)                
Regional government tax 
authority 
-0.008                   
(0.036)                   
Constant 4.874 -1.77 0.00 -1.32 -0.97 -2.45*** -2.13*** -2.14*** -1.64*** -0.94*** -0.93*** -0.06 -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.15** -0.17** 0.07 -0.04*** -0.02 
(14.284) (6.68) (0.00) (1.36) (0.64) (0.55) (0.49) (0.46) (0.28) (0.36) (0.27) (0.14) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 217 429 405 459 429 429 429 429 436 436 436 436 536 566 566 566 566 620 626 
Number of countries 28 41 33 44 41 41 41 41 44 44 44 44 45 45 45 45 45 47 48 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For the ‘RAI indicator’ model, the index for regional government policy or tax authority (Hooghe et al. 2016) is used as indicator of fiscal 
decentralization. The ‘RAI Indicator’ and the ‘fixed effects’ estimates are obtained using the fixed effects estimator. In all other cases, coefficients and standard errors estimated through two-step system GMM, applying 
forward orthogonal deviations transformation. All independent variables were assumed to be endogenous, and year dummies were included as exogenous instruments. 
